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Freud’s Rome 
 Why did Sigmund Freud abandon his Roman example?  
 Remember that Freud, in Civilization and its Discontents, had turned to Rome 
in order to show how the past lingered on in the minds of human beings. He first 
conjured up a vision of the city as it might have been experienced in his own day. 
This was a modern metropolis in which contemporary buildings and old ruins co-
existed and in which the discerning observer could find traces of different histories. In 
this city, further remnants lay undetected beneath the surface, antiquities that might 
one day be brought to the surface again and restored. But Freud then summoned up a 
second kind of Rome. “Now let us, by a flight of imagination, suppose that Rome is 
not a human habitation but a psychical entity with a similarly long and copious past—
an entity, that is to say, in which nothing that has once come into existence will have 
passed away and all the earlier phases of development continue to exist alongside the 
latest one.”1 In this city, buildings of various periods would all be standing intact, 
some of them in the same place, somehow co-habitating without the displacement of 
any older structures. “In the place occupied by the Palazzo Caffarelli would once 
more stand—without the Palazzo having to be removed—the Temple of Jupiter 
Capitolinus; and this not only in its latest shape, as the Romans of the Empire saw it, 
but also in its earliest one, when it still showed Etruscan forms and was ornamented 
with terracotta antefixes.” 2  All these palaces, temples, and monuments would be 
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visible to an observer, who “would perhaps only have to change the direction of his 
glance or his position in order to call up the one view or the other.”3 
 No sooner did Freud offer up the metaphor of Rome as a psychical entity than 
he began to back away from it. This Rome was a fantasy, Freud said, and depended 
on a scenario that was “unimaginable and even absurd”; such a city did not exist, and 
it was impossible to represent it, at least in spatial terms.4 Besides, comparing the 
human mind to a city, to any urban settlement and not just the ‘Eternal City’, was not 
feasible, and the friable quality of a city would make it unsuitable for a comparison of 
the kind undertaken by the analyst. Freud went on to disavow the analogy between 
Rome and the mind, although he also stated “the fact that it is the rule rather than the 
exception for the past to be preserved in mental life.”5 
 Readers have wondered why Freud included this description of Rome if he 
was going to deny its validity for the argument of Civilization and its Discontents. 
Various explanations have been put forward, including one by Ellen Oliensis, who 
suggests that Freud’s text shows how large-scale feelings of desire and aggression lies 
behind imperial expansion. For Freud, the ‘ego-feeling of maturity’ co-exists with the 
survival of an infantile ego-feeling, which is “a much more inclusive—indeed, an all-
embracing—feeling which corresponded to a more intimate bond between the ego and 
the world about it.” 6  This infantile ego-feeling, Freud suggests, lies behind the 
“oceanic feeling” to which he refers in Civilization and its Discontents. In presenting 
to his readers the “archaeologist’s dream (or nightmare) of total preservation” in his 
second description of Rome, Freud is also providing an example of the mature adult’s 
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desire to reconnect to that oceanic feeling.7 The psychoanalyst’s Rome “embodies the 
imperious desire to reabsorb the world the infant had perforce to let go.”8 As Oliensis 
puts it, “the oceanic feeling resurfaces as the sensation of Roman imperialism,”9 and 
Freud’s city stands for an aggressive fantasy of complete possession, in time and 
space. It is this “imperial problematic,” so well explored by Latin poets such as Virgil, 
“that Freud could not bring himself quite to write out of his Aeneid,” namely, 
Civilization and its Discontents.10 
 One way of understanding Freud’s use of Rome in Civilization and its 
Discontents is to read it as an acknowledgement of the difficulties involved in 
recalling the past and in finding ways of comprehending it satisfactorily. But Freud’s 
peculiar deployment of Rome suggests that more is at issue than infantile memory. 
Many if not most of Freud’s references to Roman buildings refer to the period of 
ancient Rome’s rise to world historical importance and to the era when it becomes 
established as the imperial capital par excellence. Approached from this perspective, 
Freud’s disavowal implies that memories of empire are not easy to explore, that they 
frustrate the best efforts to represent them, and that metaphors or rhetorical figures are 
unlikely to provide adequate models for exploring the imperial past. Neither the initial 
example of contemporary Rome nor the turbo-charged image of permanence that he 
constructs is sufficient for the purpose of working through what an imperial 
experience felt like in the past and what it might mean for the present and the future. 
Memories of empire are not (like) cities, or palimpsests, or chronotopic structures that 
can be easily accessed and analyzed. Such memories can be impactful but also 
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complex and indirect, and their recollection is never pure and simple but frequently 
uncertain, fallible, contested, and difficult. 
 An additional implication of Freud’s work is that ‘memories’ can be construed 
expansively, so that Freud’s description of Rome can itself count as a ‘memory’ of the 
city. Broadening out the term in this fashion is not inconsistent with historiographical 
developments in the twentieth and twenty-first century, when historians have become 
familiar with concepts such as collective memory, social memory, and historical 
memory and have explored the significance of ‘places of memory’. Freud himself 
provided an example of what has subsequently been called ‘mnemohistory’ in Moses 
and Monotheism, a book which tries to show how the effects of historical trauma have 
lingered among the Jewish people for centuries. Let us, therefore, take the expression 
‘memories of empire’ in a very broad sense. Memories of empire are individual and 
collective; they seep into narratives that are historical and fictional, pictorial and 
verbal; they can be found a generation after the event, or a millennium. Events may be 
forgotten or repressed, and an individual or a group may feel a compulsion to act out 
or work through what has been forgotten; at times, what is forgotten may be displaced 
or transformed into narratives that bear little correspondence to the past. For these 
reasons, any discussion of memories of empire remains challenging and tentative. 
 The expression ‘memories of empire’ is intelligible in at least two ways. In the 
sense that I have been using it can denote the memories that people or groups have of 
empires in the past. My parents’ or grandparents’ reminiscences about India during 
the period of British rule fall into this category, as do recollections by any number of 
others who were alive during the Raj. A Kenyan waiter in Barack Obama’s Dreams 
from My Father remembers “that the same people who controlled the land before 
independence still control the same land, that he still cannot eat in the restaurants or 
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stay in the hotels that the white man has built.”11 His memory of empire is framed by 
the realization that, as in colonial days, small elites control a disproportionate share of 
the country’s resources and that inequalities of wealth persist. Numerous studies attest 
to the pride, melancholia, nostalgia, guilt, and shame felt by the French or the British 
after the loss of their colonies in the twentieth century: such feelings were prompted, 
in part, by recollections of empires that once existed. National traditions, ceremonies, 
and archives are frequently built around such memories of the imperial past.12 
 But construe the genitive in a subjective rather than an objective sense and you 
grasp a different implication of the term ‘memories of empire’, and in this meaning, 
empire itself is said to have memories. What memories does empire have? Empire has 
a memory of empire. To illustrate the matter in simple terms, one might point out that 
Samudragupta’s Allahabad pillar inscription, “a foundational document of the self-
expression of imperial polity in the Sanskrit cosmopolis,” was engraved on a pillar 
used by Ashoka to display two of his edicts.13 The pillar was then exploited, after 
some centuries, by the Mughal emperors Akbar and Jahangir and has prompted 
observers to proclaim that it “embodies two millennia of Indian political charisma.”14 
Or one might deploy another chain of linked instances and say that the French and 
British Empires looked back to the Roman Empire, the Roman Empire recalled 
Alexander the Great, and Alexander himself sought to emulate the kings of Persia. 
But so bald a sequence barely does justice to the phenomenon, which needs to be 
analyzed, conceptually and in detail, and to which we can merely allude here. At any 
rate, both senses of the term ‘memories of empire’ will be relevant as we explore its 
associations in this chapter. 
                                                
11 Obama 1995, 314. 
12 Hall 1998. 
13 Pollock 2006b, 239. 
14 Ibid. 
 6 
 
Memories of Empire 
 “Around him the whole dream-world of the East took shape and substance; of 
him every old story of a divine world-conqueror was told afresh. More than eighty 
versions of the Alexander-romance, in twenty-four languages, have been collected, 
some of them the wildest of fairy-tales . . . no other story in the world has spread like 
his.” 15  Every subsequent conqueror, and conqueror manqué, has remembered 
Alexander III (‘the Great’), of Macedon. His memory has never passed into oblivion. 
So many rulers of so many countries have called themselves Alexander, Iskandar, or 
Sikandar, after him, that it would be impossible to arrive at an exact count. The 
inhabitants of parts of north-west India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan still claim descent 
from him and his soldiers. Kipling’s The Man Who Would Be King gains much of its 
plot and popularity from this conceit. In Kipling’s youth, Kafiristan was the subject of 
intense colonial interest because Britons perceived a connection, which was 
encouraged by many locals, between the Kafirs and Greco-Macedonian settlers in the 
region. Perhaps Alexander’s only historical rival is Julius Caesar, but already for 
Romans such as Caesar, Alexander had set a demanding precedent. 
 Some Romans tried to walk in the footsteps of Alexander; a few of the 
inhabitants of Pompeii walked on him, or rather, on his likeness. The Alexander 
Mosaic is a floor mosaic that was originally part of the exedra of the first peristyle in 
the so-called House of the Faun (Casa del Fauno), in Pompeii; it dates to the late 
second century BCE and now forms part of the collection of the National 
Archaeological Museum in Naples. The Mosaic was discovered in October 1831. At 
the time, the House of the Faun was known as the House of Goethe (Casa di Goethe), 
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in honour of the poet, who had visited the site in 1787, “just when German 
Romanticism had transformed the classical world in its image, largely through the 
agency of Goethe’s genius.”16 Goethe added a drawing made by Wilhem Zahn of the 
mosaic to his collection in Weimar not long before his death. The words he wrote 
down on receiving the drawing are frequently quoted: “The present and the future will 
not succeed in commenting in a manner worthy of this artistic wonder, and we must 
always return, after studying and investigating it, to simple, pure admiration.”17 [Plate 
1] 
 
 
 
Plate 1. The Alexander Mosaic, ca. 100 BCE. Museo Archeologico Nazionale di 
Napoli. 
  
                                                
16 Badian 2012, 404–406. 
17 Goethe, letter to Wilhelm Johann Carl Zahn (10 March 1832), in Goethe 1967, 4.473–476, at 475: 
‘Mitwelt und Nachwelt werden nicht hinreichen, solches Wunder der Kunst würdig zu kommentieren, 
und wir genötigt sein, nach aufklärender Betrachtung und Untersuchung, immer wieder zur einfachen 
reinen Bewunderung zurückzukehren.’ 
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 Goethe thought that attaching his own name to this house in Pompeii was “an 
echo from the past meant to temper the loss of my son.”18 The casa of Alexander for 
the death of a son — what would Freud say? In fact, the young Freud had been 
enthusiastic about Alexander and advocated, successfully, that his younger brother be 
named after the Macedonian conqueror. Much later, Freud was to write to Carl Jung, 
“Just rest easy, my dear son Alexander, I will leave you more to conquer than I 
myself have managed, all psychiatry and the approval of the civilized world, which 
regards me as a savage!” 19  The ‘deeply oedipal undertones’ of this remark are 
evident; the remark also casts an informative light on “Freud’s original desire to name 
his own brother Alexander in the first place, as if to displace his own oedipal feelings 
toward his father.”20 Freud’s statement illustrates to us that Alexander often appears 
in oedipal relationships and that he is used to address issues of power, conquest, and 
desire.  
 It is simplistic to say that the Romans’ fascination with Alexander had an 
oedipal element to it. Yet, whatever commenting in a manner worthy of the Alexander 
Mosaic might look like, any such commentary would have to take into account the 
interpretive ambiguity of the image, an ambiguity that renders the image at once 
admiring and hesitant in its stance toward Alexander.21 On the one hand, the Mosaic 
‘represents’ a scene from a battle that Alexander won and pays tribute to the victor 
and to his subjugation of the Persians, at Gaugamela and elsewhere. On the other 
hand, the Mosaic undercuts Alexander’s triumph and calls into question the value of 
his conquests. The prominence given to the Persian king Darius is extraordinary. 
                                                
18 Goethe, letter to Carl Friedrich Zelter (11 March 1832), in Goethe 1967, 4.476–478, at 477: ‘Ein 
Echo aus der Ferne, welches den Verlust meines Sohnes mildern soll.’ Translation in Bodley 2009, 
552. 
19 Quoted in Armstrong 2005, 108. 
20 Armstrong ibid. 
21 See the discussion in Briant 2003, 226–247. 
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Critics such as Ernst Badian have said that he “dominates the action,” and Darius 
assuredly seems to rise above the fray in his chariot.22 The “look of horror on his 
face” is brought on by the “self-sacrifice of his fellow nobles” and shows him as a 
sympathetic ruler, distraught at the loss of his countrymen.23 By contrast, Alexander is 
“leaning away from his enemy,” and his helmet has been knocked off his head: “he is, 
to put it bluntly, a man who has lost his hat.”24 Badian writes, “The representation as a 
whole may justly be called not merely not heroic, but deliberately unheroic . . .”25 
Moreover, the figural counterpart to Darius is not Alexander but a dead tree. Badian 
reads the tree as a symbol of “the destruction and denudation caused by Alexander’s 
war” and for “the vanity of human, and especially of heroic, effort”;26 for him, the 
centrality and symbolism of the tree is suggested not by Greek or Roman artistic 
precedent but by “Persian hunting scenes in paradeisoi depicted in Asia Minor.”27 Far 
from promoting Alexander’s success over the Persians, the Mosaic emphasizes the 
sorrow of the Persians and the emptiness of the conqueror’s accomplishment. 
 The location of the Mosaic complicates our understanding of the work’s 
reception in antiquity. Pompeii was notionally not a ‘Roman’ town in the late second 
century BCE, and the Pompeiians obtained Roman citizenship only in the first century 
BCE. The owner of the house may have been from Samnium, as some have 
suggested, and may have had pro-Roman or anti-Roman views, or views that were 
ambivalent about Rome.28 Even the fact that the Mosaic was on the floor of the 
peristyle adds to the indeterminacy of meaning. In her book about the Roman 
Alexander, Diana Spencer says, “[T]he most fundamental instability for this mosaic is 
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25 Ibid. 
26 Badian 2012, 410–411. 
27 Badian 2012, 415. 
28 Cohen 1997, 180–181, 193–194. 
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its openness to a multiplicity of angles of gaze. It is on the floor, beneath the feet of 
any who enter the room from the peristyle from which it opened. This vast mosaic 
provides an Alexander who can be trampled upon, turned on his head or sideways, 
who can be a decorative addendum to a garden, or its focal point, all at the whim of 
the course strolled by the viewer. One could even, potentially, excise Alexander 
altogether and gaze from one garden to the next without dropping one’s eyes to the 
floor.”29 It hardly needs to be added that Darius, too, could have been trampled upon 
by anyone in the room. That the Mosaic presents so conflicted a response to 
Alexander indicates that on the Italian Peninsula, by the first century BCE, he was 
being remembered not solely as an invincible soldier but also as a symbol of vanity 
and the transience of military success. 
 Let us place another image alongside the Alexander Mosaic, a painting not 
from the Roman era but made by an empire that never ceased to recall the Romans 
and their imperial accomplishments. ‘The East Offering its Riches to Britannia’ 
(1778), which was painted by Spiridione Roma, used to be part of the ceiling of the 
Revenue Committee Room, in East India House, and now can be found near the top 
of a stairway in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, in London. When the East 
India House building in Leadenhall Street was torn down, the painting was removed 
from the ceiling and relocated to the India Office, which was itself later absorbed into 
the FCO complex. It is not a surprise that a painting commissioned by the officers of 
the East India Company occupies a position in an official building of the government 
of the United Kingdom. The government of the twenty-first century continues to use 
many of the insignia, institutions, and monuments that were created in the days of its 
empire, and, in that sense, the government keeps alive the memory of an old empire. 
                                                
29 Spencer 2002, 188–189. 
 11 
Nor is it a surprise, of course, that a former imperial capital such as London is filled 
with memorials to empire, and in that sense the city resembles Beijing, Istanbul, or 
Madrid. Roma’s painting is merely one of many imperial creations that has continued 
into the postcolonial present, where it resonates with contemporary concerns and 
serves as a reminder of an epoch when the Company was a going concern. [Plate 2.] 
 
 
 
Plate 2. Spiridione Roma, ‘The East Offering Its Riches to Britannia’, 1778. 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London. 
 
 The painting’s classicizing features refer its viewers back to ancient Rome; 
these are typical of the late eighteenth century, but in this case are put at the service of 
the ambitions of the powerful Company. A description offered by Gentleman’s 
magazine, in 1778, is worth appreciating at length: 
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 “The principal figure represents Britannia seated on a rock, to 
signify the firmness and stability of the empire; and as guardian and 
protectress of the Company, who are denoted by children behind 
Britannia, and overshadowed by her veil. 
 The union of the old and new Companies is expressed by two 
children embracing each other, and one of them placed sitting on the 
upper part of the rock, to show the firm basis on which the present 
Company stands; on the other part of the rock the child climbing up 
towards the summit is intended to express the prospect of the 
Company’s continuance.  
 Britannia is characterised by the usual emblems of the shield 
and spear, and guarded by a lion, which lays tamely by her side, 
pleased with the offerings made her from the different East-Indian 
provinces.  
 At the foot of the rock lays the genius of the Ganges, in a 
majestic attitude, pouring out his whole stream on Britannia’s 
footstool.  
 The various provinces are represented under the Conduct of 
Mercury, the god of merchandise, eagerly pressing to deposit their 
different produce and manufactures before the throne of Britannia.  
 Calcutta (the capital settlement of the Company in Bengal) 
presents a basket with pearls and other rich jewels, which Britannia 
receives.  
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 China is characterised by jars of porcelain and chests of tea; the 
produce of Madras and Bombay by a corded bale; Bengal is denoted 
by an elephant, palm-trees and a camel.  
 Persia appears at a distance bringing silks, drugs, and other 
effects, and with her are to be supposed all the rest of the provinces; 
which the artist could not describe on the canvas without crowding or 
destroying the whole composition, and harmony of the picture.  
 At a distance is an Indiaman under sail, laden with the treasure 
of the East, an emblem of that commerce from which both Britain and 
the Company derive great and singular advantages.”30 
Few images illustrate more dramatically the ‘gentlemanly capitalism’ of the 
Company, its self-image as a national enterprise, and its political and mercantile 
ambitions across the seas. As the riches of India, China, and Persia are made available 
to Britannia, who, from her elevated perch, looks down on the other characters, no 
trace of force or violence is manifest in the picture, the Company’s arms and sepoys 
being wholly effaced from the tableau. The gestures of the Eastern figures are those of 
presentation, that is, obeisance and offering, as if these riches were being eagerly and 
respectfully tendered to the Company: Calcutta presents, Britannia receives, as the 
magazine’s description has it. The movement across the painting’s horizontal axis is 
thus of giving and taking, with jewels and pearls on offer, and Mercury, the god of 
commerce, extending his staff in the direction of Britannia. Hovering discreetly in the 
back and centre is the ship that conveys these valuable commodities back to Britain, 
while Ganges, an almost indifferent figure, in the foreground allows his waters to 
flow beneath the elevated Britannia. 
                                                
30 Gentleman’s Magazine 48 1778, 628–629. 
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 Roma’s painting was commissioned by the Company and aimed to please its 
patron. A preliminary drawing, made in pencil, pen, wash, and signed by Roma, 
suggests that he was asked to make certain changes to his original design, presumably 
to accommodate the wishes of the Directors.31 The design was brought closer to an 
existing marble chimney frieze, which was about a related theme (‘Britannia 
receiving the riches of the East’) and which had adorned the Director’s Court Room 
in Leadenhall Street since about 1730. One critic writes, “The finished painting is 
altogether more classical in conception with a greater degree of symbolism . . . The 
theme has also changed; and Britannia now dominates the scene.”32 The preliminary 
drawing is missing Britannia, Mercury, and the lion, among other things, and does not 
show Calcutta offering its riches either. The Directors were plainly seeking a more 
classicizing idiom for the painting and they chose to emphasize their contribution to 
the nation by asking Roma to alter his initial plans. They wanted to be remembered by 
a painting that was more classical, more evocative of older histories, than the initial 
design of the artist. 
 The painting used to be a fixture in a building that had been constructed over 
another image, an image which served as a marker of the Roman Empire in Britain. A 
mosaic dating from the Roman era was found underneath the premises of the East 
India Company, to the surprise of nineteenth-century observers. ‘Appropriately 
enough’, notes the British Museum, to which the work was transferred in the 1860s, 
the mosaic shows the god Bacchus riding or reclining on a tiger and alludes to the 
story of the god’s journey to India. [Plate 3] Appropriately enough, the mosaic shows 
a memory trace of the Roman presence in Britain coming back to the surface in a 
century when Britons increasingly compared their own empire to the Roman Empire, 
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when they came to think that they were displacing the Romans as the most powerful 
empire-builders on earth, and when they were consolidating their hold over the Indian 
subcontinent. 
 
 
 
Plate 3. The Leadenhall Street Mosaic. © Trustees of the British Museum. 
 
Trauma 
 The history of empires provides no shortage of traumatic events and no dearth 
of commemorations either. What counts as trauma, how you remember a traumatic 
event, and what you remember of it depends, of course, on who is doing the 
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remembering. Already by the ninth century CE, Arabs were mourning the loss or 
transformation of their empire, especially since it was the peoples they conquered 
who more or less displaced them from the seat of power.33 The end of the British 
Empire was welcomed by hundreds of millions, but many millions of others lamented 
the loss and displacement that followed. Who was traumatized by the Morant Bay 
rebellion, the Mau Mau uprising, and the Indian Mutiny of 1857? The colonizers, the 
colonized, or both? To take the example of the Indian uprising, many in Britain had 
little doubt that the ‘Sepoy Mutiny’ was an unjustified and violent provocation by 
Indians against the British, or that it needed to be stopped ruthlessly. A recent study, 
by Christopher Herbert, bears the title War of No Pity: The Indian Mutiny and 
Victorian Trauma and seeks to show that the response to the uprising of 1857 was 
multifaceted in Britain and that not every British commentary should “properly be 
read as anything like a confident allegory of British virtue and racial entitlement to 
rule.”34 For Hibbert, the uprising caused Victorian British writers to come face to face 
with the excesses of their own rule in India, with its racism, violence, and venality. He 
writes, “The shock of finding that they were despised by their supposedly grateful 
imperial subjects in India was in part the shock of finding that their national idealism 
and national self-esteem were self-deluding and morally corrupting.”35 Yet, Hibbert’s 
study itself has prompted a reviewer to observe, “The trauma of the traumatizers 
becomes a cause for great compassion, and their honesty about their participation in it 
a cause for tremendous admiration and, indeed, forgiveness.”36 
 The impact of the uprising on the British, in South Asia and Britain, in the 
nineteenth century, can scarcely be in doubt. St James’s Church in Delhi still bears 
                                                
33 See Crone 2006. 
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Victorian inscriptions that “pay tribute to the military and civilian casualties: to three 
members of the Corbett family, ‘who were murdered During the Massacre of the 
Christians in Delhi’; to Thomas Collins and no fewer than 23 members of his 
extended family, ‘all barbarously murdered at Delhi on or about the 11th of May 
1857’; to Dr Chimmun Lall, a ‘native Christian and a Worshipper in this Church’, 
who ‘fell a martyr to his faith on the day of the massacre of Christians in Delhi’.”37 
Some thirty years after the events, Blackwood’s magazine claimed that “there were 
more accounts of the Mutiny in popular fiction than of any other nineteenth-century 
event.”38 According to one reckoning, about seventy novels about the uprising were 
published, most of them in the nineteenth century.39 
 By the early years of the twentieth century, the uprising was an occasion for 
commemoration and for acknowledging the bravery of those who fought on behalf of 
God and Empire. On 23 December 1907, fifty years after the uprising, the British 
survivors came together for dinner, at the Royal Albert Hall, in London, as guests of 
the owners of the Daily Telegraph. On the following day, “At the conclusion of Lord 
Roberts’ speech . . . the ‘Last Post’ was sounded . . . Mr Ben Davies then sang 
‘Recessional’, and Mr Lowis Waller recited a commemorative poem by Mr Rudyard 
Kipling entitled ‘1857-1907’. The proceedings closed with ‘Auld Lang Syne’ sung by 
Miss Muriel Foster and Mr Ben Davies . . .”40 The poem that Kipling wrote to 
acompany this characteristically British celebration of bravery was entitled ‘The 
Veterans’ and went as follows: 
“TO-DAY, across our fathers’ graves, 
  The astonished years reveal 
                                                
37 Jasanoff  2005. 
38 Schwarz 2011, 235, summarizing Gregg 1897. 
39 Chakravarty 2005. 
40 The Times, quoted at http://www.kipling.org.uk/rg_veterans1.htm. 
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The remnant of that desperate host 
  Which cleansed our East with steel.  
 
Hail and farewell! We greet you here, 
  With tears that none will scorn— 
O Keepers of the House of old, 
  Or ever we were born!  
 
One service more we dare to ask— 
  Pray for us, heroes, pray, 
That when Fate lays on us our task 
  We do not shame the Day!”41 
The classical and biblical echoes are not surprising from Kipling, who elsewhere 
wrote of the mutineers in pejorative terms. In this poem, the narrator salutes the 
soldiers who are present at the gathering, doughty soldiers who are said to have used 
their steel swords and ‘cleansed’ the colony of its murderous rebels; the narrator asks 
that younger defenders of the Indian Empire similarly to rise to the task and not be 
found wanting on Judgement Day.  
 The distance of nationalist Indian commentators from this kind of tribute and 
from earlier treatments such as John Kaye’s History of the Sepoy War in India (1864–
76), can be measured by reading the title alone of Vir Savarkar’s Indian War of 
Independence (1909). Savarkar’s book was one of many Indian responses to the 
uprising; several took the nationalist line and preferred to see the events of 1857 as 
the stirrings of a widespread native demand for independence rather than as a small 
                                                
41 From The Years Between, in Kipling 1938, 353. 
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mutiny by soldiers in the army of the East India Company. Savarkar wrote about “the 
brilliance of a War of Independence shining in ‘the mutiny of 1857’” and described 
how “out of the heap of ashes appeared forth sparks of a fiery inspiration.”42 Prone to 
characterize the uprising also as a ‘Revolution’, he claimed, “The seed of the 
Revolution of 1857 is in this holy and inspiring idea, clear and explicit, propounded 
from the throne of Delhi, THE PROTECTION OF RELIGION AND COUNTRY.”43 What was 
the uprising: a sepoy mutiny, a war of independence, or a revolution? 
 The debate is familiar: it can be traced back to disputes of the Victorian period 
and unfolded in both Britain and India. It will suffice here to say that the legacy of 
this reception continues to be felt in the Indian subcontinent where school textbooks 
caution against an unqualified use of the word ‘mutiny’ and also recognise the 
contested nature of the historical record. That the Mutiny continues to provoke strong 
passions in India can be learned from the force of the protests that greeted a British 
party to Lucknow when, in 2007, on the 150th anniversary of the uprising, it 
attempted to visit a church for British soldiers who lost their lives in the conflict.44 In 
the same year, the Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, made an address to Parliament 
in which he said that Indians “cannot forget those inspired revolutionaries—many of 
them anonymous to history—who sacrificed their lives in 1857 to free the country 
from foreign yoke.” 45  William Dalrymple’s detailed account, The Last Mughal 
(2006), arguably prompted more debate in India than in Britain. In the subcontinent, 
reviewers vigorously objected to his claim that Indian historians had neglected 
sources in their own archives and had not written about the uprising from an Indian 
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perspective. In Britain, the debate was far less heated and the book created a smaller 
splash than its predecessor, White Mughals, which recounted the tragic love story of 
James Achilles Kirkpatrick and Khair un-Nissa. But the uprising had begun to lose its 
hold on the British imagination as early as the Second World War, when Madame 
Tussaud’s removed its wax statue of Lord Roberts, a recipient of the Victoria Cross 
for gallantry during the uprising, the hero of Kandahar, and Commander-in-Chief, 
India. The removal, we are told, was “a matter of no public controversy as no one 
much remembered who he was or what he had done.”46  
 That the uprising was traumatic for nearly everyone involved in the action can 
hardly be in question. The repercussions were vividly felt, by Kipling among others. 
Kipling was born in Bombay several years after the events, in 1865, but he grasped 
like no other Anglo-Indian writer the fragility of the hold exercised by the rulers over 
the native population. Even if he could not have experienced the uprising first-hand, 
and even if Bombay was far from the scenes of the most violent encounters, he lived 
among those who could not forget what must have seemed an unimaginable horror, a 
horror doubtless amplified by hearsay and the passage of time. 
 Consider the The Strange Ride of Morrowbie Jukes, which was published in 
1885, and which remains what Angus Wilson, in The Strange Ride of Rudyard 
Kipling, called “one of the most powerful nightmares of the precariousness of a ruling 
group, in this case of a group haunted by memories of the Mutiny not yet twenty years 
old.”47 In Kipling’s short story, the protagonist, Morrowbie Jukes, accidentally strays 
into a sandy crater with a low-lying encampment inhabited by the living dead, or as 
the narrator says, by “the Dead who did not die, but may not live.”48 These were 
Hindu Indians who were believed to be dead and who showed signs of life just on the 
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point of cremation but who could not be returned to the world of the living since the 
last rites had already been performed on them and were thus forced to live in badger-
holes in the small village beside a river. The site’s residents were prevented from 
fleeing by swampland, by high sand walls that enclosed the crater on the sides which 
did not open onto the river, and by a boat that patrolled the river all day. Jukes falls 
into the place by accident when his horse bolts and flies headlong into the crater so 
that both animal and rider find themselves among a group whose “filth and 
repulsiveness . . . [are] beyond all description.”49 The only native to recognize Jukes 
in the village is a man called Gunga Dass, who used to be in charge of a telegraph 
office. But these natives are not prone to defer to their colonial masters, for instead of 
encountering the “civility from my inferiors” to which he had grown accustomed, 
“even in these days, when local self-government has destroyed the greater part of a 
native’s respect for a Sahib,” Jukes is greeted with the sounds of cackling laughter, 
whistling, and howling.50 Ultimately, Jukes’ servant boy, Dunnoo, tracks the horse’s 
hooves to the crater and hauls him out of the village of the dead and delivers him back 
into the world of the living. 
 In commenting on Kipling’s work, Christopher Lane has suggested that “the 
colonial drive leads its subject inexorably toward ruin and death.” Lane adds, “When 
Freud likened the ego’s regulation of the unconscious to ‘a man on horse-back, who 
has to hold in check the superior strength of the horse,’ he unwittingly endorsed the 
most common allegorical structure of Kipling’s fiction.”51 Thus, Jukes’ strange ride 
“over what seemed to be a limitless expanse of moonlit sand”52 links the story, in 
Freudian terms, to colonial fantasies about “the convulsive bliss of self-sabotage — a 
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jouissance ride into the hole of oblivion and the brink of the real.”53  From this 
perspective, Jukes’ decision to saddle his horse and hunt down the “huge black and 
white beast” that is keeping him up at night can be read in the terms of a colonial 
psychodrama, made all the more pungent by the “delirium of fever and the excitement 
of rapid motion through the air” that marks the rider’s journey over the sand dunes 
and into an abyss of inversion. And the crater, which lies across the sands and beyond 
the colonial outpost, thus comes to symbolize “Jukes’ self-destructive fantasy.”54 
 Yet, Kipling indulges the fantasy of self-destruction only up to the point when 
Jukes is rescued by his servant, Dunnoo. The ‘normal’ master/servant relationship is 
reasserted at the end of the story and the exploration of the troubling world is called 
off in a few sentences. What scares Jukes in the crater is not just that the worst 
elements of colonial India are all compressed into a small space — disease, filth, 
smells, lack of hygiene, the breakdown of hierarchy — but also that his own life may 
someday come to resemble his fearful experience. For Jukes, the crater in the sands 
not only bears witness to the breakdown of colonial rule but also offers a harrowing 
vision of life among the natives as an equal. It is not an experience that Jukes expects 
to suffer in the near future, but it may yet lie after that moment on the horizon which 
marks the end of empire. 
 
Melancholia 
 In his book After Empire, Paul Gilroy writes about the ‘imperial melancholia’ 
that Britons have come to feel following the end of their empire. Gilroy’s discussion 
owes as much to the social psychology of Alexander Mitscherlich and Margarete 
Mitscherlich (Die Unfähigkeit zu trauern, ‘The Inability to Mourn’) as to Freud’s 
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analyses of mourning, melancholia, and narcissism.55 The Mitscherlichs wrote about 
“the loss of a fantasy of omnipotence,” and Gilroy extends their work to say: “From 
this perspective, before the British people can adjust to the horrors of their modern 
history and start to build a new national identity from the debris of their broken 
narcissism, they will have to learn to appreciate the brutalities of colonial rule enacted 
in their name and to their benefit, to understand the damage it did to their political 
culture at home and abroad, and to consider the extent of their country’s complex 
investments in the ethnic absolutism that has sustained it.” Gilroy adds that Britons 
have been slow to work through “[t]he multilayered trauma—economic and cultural 
as well as political and psychological—involved in accepting the loss of the 
Empire.”56 As a result of their slowness in working through this trauma, he suggests, 
the British have been unable to deal fairly with questions of race, ethnicity, and 
nationhood or to respond hospitably to the arrival of immigrants, especially those who 
come from former colonies. 
 One reason why the trauma of imperial loss has been treated inadequately is 
that the public sphere in Britain has not dealt effectively with memories of empire. 
Many Britons are embarrassed and ashamed about the country’s imperial past and 
want to forget that part of the nation’s history, even if they were actively involved in 
it and even if they ultimately cannot forget. Many of those who were born during or 
after the Second World War suppose that the history of the British Empire has little 
relevance to the modern nation. There are others who glory in the history of empire 
and exhort their fellow Britons proudly to embrace this chapter of their past and to 
value its contributions to culture and civilization. But, in the terms of Gilroy’s 
diagnosis, we can say that the imperial legacy is not addressed directly by these 
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groups of people and that, rather, the Empire is brushed under the carpet, its 
importance is minimized, or its achievements are championed simplistically. None of 
these attitudes to the Empire can be construed as a satisfactory attempt to engage with 
its afterlife, and none of them is, therefore, going to lead to a more inclusive 
reckoning with history. A consequence of this pathology is the nation’s dysfunctional 
stance toward its own history no less than toward racial and immigrant minorities. 
 J. Enoch Powell, who was a classical scholar before he gained notoriety as a 
politician, is sometimes characterized as an extreme personification of this condition, 
but he was only an unusually articulate spokesperson for a widespread phenomenon. 
He had a way of conjuring up images that would catch the attention of the press and 
the public, as he did when he spoke of the river foaming with much blood or of the 
time the black man would have the whip-hand over the white man. After Edward 
Heath, the leader of the Conservative Party, dismissed him from the shadow cabinet 
on the grounds that his speech was “racialist in tone and liable to exacerbate racial 
tensions,” polls showed the public coming out in support of Powell by an 
overwhelming majority: in a survey conducted by the Wolverhampton Express and 
Star, 372 thought that Heath was right to dismiss him, but 35,000 said Heath was 
wrong.57 What is interesting about Powell, in this context, is that, as an older man, he 
did not boast loudly about the Empire and appeared to have lost his youthful 
enthusiasm for it. But he, like his many supporters, was able to talk explicitly about 
racial and ethnic issues, the perils of immigration, and the decline of England, and all 
these conversations “drew upon memories of the imperial past.”58 As Bill Schwarz 
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writes, “Inside the nation’s forgetfulness about empire, the memory-traces remained. 
Empire may not have been spoken for what it was. It was, however, present.”59 
 Traces of imperial melancholia permeated through the culture broadly and 
could be found in non-racial discourses as well. In the early 1980s, Salman Rushdie 
famously attacked novels, television series, and films set in colonial India for their 
‘Raj revisionism’ and pointed out that they were proliferating roughly at the same 
time as the Falkland Islands war, which, in his view, was spearheaded by Margaret 
Thatcher, “who most plainly nailed her colours to the colonial mast, claiming that the 
success in the South Atlantic proved that the British were still the people ‘who had 
ruled a quarter of the world’.” 60  Raj nostalgia was really connected with the 
ideologies of the ruling Conservatives, as Rushdie argued, and would not lead to a 
deeper historical appreciation of the fraught British presence in India or the 
relationship between Indians and Britons in the colonial period. It was associated with 
melancholia and was a defensive response to the traumatic loss of empire: it put 
Rushdie “in mind of the phantom twitchings of an amputated limb.”61 Raj nostalgia 
flourished for some years but now has been subsumed into neo-Victorian and neo-
Edwardian fiction, which consists of texts set in the long nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. Yet, not all these texts are explicitly about empire (for instance, 
Possession, by A. S. Byatt, offers only a fleeting glance at a postcolonial 
interlocutor), and some are explicitly critical about the colonial power and/or created 
outside the old metropolitan centre of London (for instance, the Hindi film Lagaan). 
These texts are not just colonialist in the sense that Rushdie deplored, therefore, but 
also postcolonial, in all the senses of that term. To quote one scholar who has written 
about the genre, “the return to the Victorian in the present offers a highly visible, 
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highly aestheticized code for confronting empire again and anew; it is a site within 
which the memory of empire and its surrounding discourses and strategies of 
representation can be replayed and played out.”62 
 Britain is not the only country to suffer from the kind of imperial melancholia 
that Gilroy describes, and he himself mentions Belgium, France, Spain, Italy, and the 
Netherlands as other countries that have yet to fully acknowledge their colonial 
histories and the violence done to the colonized and the colonizer in the name of 
empire.63 To this list, one should also add the United States of America, a country 
which has continued to act as an imperialist power in our time. Each nation deals 
differently with imperial trauma and melancholia, and in the case of the USA, the 
traumas have taken many forms, including the war in Vietnam, the Iran hostage crisis, 
and the attacks of 11 September 2001. After each of these events, many Americans 
believed that their nation was required to respond forcefully, that decisive action 
needed to be taken overseas, and that national pride had to be restored. The first Gulf 
War was seen by several commentators as America’s attempt to lay to rest the ghosts 
of Vietnam and Iran; the later invasion of Iraq and the war in Afghanistan were direct 
responses to the attacks of 9/11. But an extremely bloody aftermath followed the 
occupation of Iraq, while the war in Afghanistan has continued for many years, with 
an enormous loss of life on all sides. In each case, America has failed to achieve all its 
objectives, ill-defined as these were in the first place. The invasions of Iraq and 
Afghanistan, combined with the economic recession that began in 2008, have led 
observers to speak of the decline of the American empire and of an imperial 
melancholia in that culture as well. 
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 But it is misleading to talk about imperial melancholia only in relation to the 
colonial metropoles of London, Paris, and Washington, D.C., or only in relation to 
places such as Gibraltar, the Falkland Islands, and Tibet where Empire survives. 
Many people today manifest a form of nostalgia for the Muslim Caliphate. Algeria, 
Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, India, Ireland, the Korean Peninsula, South Africa, 
and the Caribbean, all are locations in which memories of empire still remain, where 
men and women hark back to a lost golden age and dream of an earlier political order. 
To varying degrees, a sense of trauma and feelings of melancholia and nostalgia can 
be perceived among some groups in these postcolonial cultures. We can discern these 
emotions most starkly in local elites, abandoned or largely forgotten by the 
colonizers, and not as successful or powerful as they once were, but also among 
subalterns and non-elites. A whole body of prose and verse has explored how 
questions of empire persist in the words and actions of people living in former 
colonies, in memories and memoirs, visual materials, archives, institutions, and 
bureaucracies. J. M. Coetzee, Seamus Heaney, V. S. Naipaul, Derek Walcott, and 
Rushdie himself can be counted among the most distinguished exponents of this 
literature. Not only do they examine the bloody legacies of the colonial past: they also 
explore the many charms, allures, and seductions of empire and depict the betrayal 
and disappointment left in its wake. 
 
The Postcolonial Predicament 
 While nationalism nurtured colonial and anti-colonial movements, nationalism 
has continued to shape the legacies of empires in the wake of decolonization and 
postcoloniality. Nations and political parties regularly invoke public memories to 
authorize a particular claim to the past or to promote a particular conception of the 
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community. It is not surprising that the political use of memory, especially the 
memory of empire, stirs up debate, rouses fierce passions, or provokes conflict. But 
these divisions are as much about the community’s conception of itself in the present 
and future as they are about judging the past. Longing to shape the public agenda or to 
implement dearly held policies, political leaders are driven to memorialize histories, 
to refashion or repudiate traditions, and to insist on accounts congenial to their own 
interests. 
 Nationalist passions and imperial memories fuelled each other, for instance, 
long after France was compelled to withdraw its troops from Algeria and accept the 
independence of its colony. In the years following the Algerian War of Independence 
(Thawra al-Jazā’iriyya, 1954–1962), the French government seemed not to want to 
acknowledge or mention either that there had been a war or that the nation was a 
colonial power in Algeria. Instead of a reckoning or a formal acceptance of the 
colonial war, there was a prolonged evasion — despite, or because of, an official 
death toll in the tens of thousands, the destruction of entire communities, and the 
widespread use of torture. It was the war that dared not speak its name: until 1999, the 
official name for the conflict used to be ‘des opérations de securité et de maintien de 
l’ordre’. Why was the war not acknowledged officially for forty years? Patricia 
Lorcin explains the situation thus: “For France, the relinquishing of Algeria was a 
political, economic, and psychological loss . . . There was a measure of shame 
attached to the loss, whether it was shame at having indulged in the deplorable 
experience of colonization and colonial warfare, which dishonored France’s 
humanitarian traditions, or shame at having lost what was perceived to be ‘rightfully 
French’ and thus at diminishing France’s world status. These conflicting sentiments 
meant that no dominant memory could satisfactorily emerge. Instead, there was 
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silence—a silence resonating with France’s inability to forget.”64 And so, for all the 
critiques of the war by thinkers of the stature of Jean-Paul Sartre, the official position 
of the French government remained unchanged for decades after the formal end of 
hostilities. 
 Yet, this combination of nationalism and official amnesia did not pass 
uncontested, with the debate joined by loud voices on all sides. As one would expect, 
the use of torture in the French-Algerian war sparked particularly heated 
controversies, accusations, and denunciations. Soon after Louisette Inghilahriz, a 
member of the Front de libération nationale (FLN), spoke about her torture to Le 
Monde, in 2000, others attempted to recount their own experiences, and prominent 
writers and activists, including Henri Alleg and Pierre Vidal-Naquet, “called on 
France to acknowledge and condemn torture during the guerre d’Algérie.” 65 
Notoriously, a French general, Paul Aussaresses, admitted to the use of torture. But 
after Aussaresses’ declaration, former soldiers of the Algerian War published a 
collection entitled Le livre blanc de l’armée française en Algérie, which, according to 
Alleg, “justified the torture and assassinations committed under their orders, as well 
as the methods they had been ‘obliged’ to use against the ‘rebels’ and their 
accomplices.”66 Were the French justified in using torture during the colonial war? 
Who tortured whom? How should allegations of torture be addressed so many years 
after the event, given that people’s memories and official records can be so 
tendentious and partial? These are some of the questions that circulated in France as 
the nation sought to resolve the consequences of its colonial occupation of a part of 
North Africa. 
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 In Algeria, meanwhile, the post-1992 civil violence between government and 
non-government forces has provided a different context to torture. The practice of 
torture in postcolonial Algeria has meant that discussions of the subject cannot avoid 
accounting for its use during the more recent violence (when Algerians tortured 
Algerians) as well as during the Algerian War (when the French tortured Algerians): 
in Algeria, past and present regimes stand to be indicted in the matter. As David 
Prochaska writes, “Intellectually, the stakes in recovering a previously occluded 
historical past in Algeria are even higher than in France, where it is about recovering 
a key episode in recent French history, because in the Maghreb it is ultimately a 
matter regarding the history of the Algerian nation in the past half-century, the history 
of Algerian nationalism, and the FLN’s claim of embodying Algerian nationalism.”67 
In this scenario, the contemporary political situation colours the reception of 
memories of the war and potentially implicates Algerians in a brutal practice with a 
long history in the country. While the violence has been relatively less intense since 
2006, memories of the colonial era are not yet fully worked through: the complicity of 
their own elites in acts of torture, repression, and kidnapping has made it difficult for 
Algerians to arrive at a historically sensitive reckoning of an earlier period in which 
torture was practised on Algerians. If the national euphoria that followed 
decolonization allowed Algerians to gloss over the different roles (for or against 
French colonialism) they played during the war, the civil unrest of the last two 
decades re-opened the wounds and allowed them to fester anew. 
 The French government’s trouble with the naming of the war in Algeria 
reminds us that the names we give to events reveal a great deal about how we want to 
talk about them. The question of ‘the proper name’ haunts not just former colonizers 
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but also many postcolonial societies, as the latter seek control over signs and symbols 
in the public sphere and over narratives that are told about the past. Here, again, the 
contemporary national situation intersects with the memory traces left behind by 
empire. India is no stranger to the politics of naming, as Bombay, Calcutta, and 
Madras have yielded to Mumbai, Kolkata, and Chennai. Bombay was officially 
renamed ‘Mumbai’ in 1995, for example, when the central government of India 
acceded to the formal demands of the state government of Maharashtra, then ruled by 
an alliance of two parties, the Shiv Sena and the Bharatiya Janata Party. The renaming 
of the city was consistent with the nativist and nationalist ideologies of the parties: the 
Shiv Sena is a regional right-wing party that has aggressively promoted what it 
considers Maharashtrian culture, and the BJP is a national right-wing Hindu party. 
For members of these parties, the act of renaming was an assertion of a regional 
identity and a repudiation of a colonial European past; it was the declaration of a 
Maharashtrian and a Hindu claim on the city. The passage from Bombay to Mumbai 
indicated that “the city could be reinscribed in a national territory as a ‘proper’ Indian 
city, within a national history and an emerging national modernity that recognized its 
indigenous cultural and linguistic roots, and its name could be properly enunciated in 
the vernacular.”68 In fact, the change also corresponded to other nominal changes that 
had occurred, or were about to occur, in the city. The name of the main railway 
station, Victoria Terminus, was altered to Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus, in 1996, 
while, in 1975, the Victoria & Albert Museum had been rechristened the Dr Bhau 
Daji Lad Mumbai City Museum. Numerous roads, monuments, and institutions 
acquired new names, often to the exasperation of residents. But the demand to change 
the city’s name was inspired by movements going back at least to the 1960s, and no 
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political party opposed the change of name. The renaming was supported by 
socialists, leftists, moderates, and many others, even though the formal change was 
implemented during a fanatically right-wing administration. At one level, therefore, 
the change to Mumbai can be understood as the recognition and reassertion of native 
agency in the age of postcolonialism. 
 Not everyone, however, celebrated the change in the city’s name or the 
implications of that metamorphosis. At the time of the change, in 1995, a prominent 
individual from a rival political party described the action as a diversion from the 
socio-economic problems of the city, a view echoed by contemporary 
commentators.69 Many complained that the city’s varied, flexible, and open identity 
was obscured by the new designation, that its cosmopolitan history had been hijacked 
by right-wing supremacists, and that the Shiv Sena was attempting to turn Bombay 
into a Maharashtrian Hindu enclave, emptied of Muslims and other minorities. “And 
there was no good reason to change the name of Bombay,” Suketu Mehta writes in 
Maximum City, a book that is not misty-eyed about the city’s darker histories or its 
structures of oppression. “It is nonsense to say that Mumbai was the original name. 
Bombay was created by the Portuguese and the British from a cluster of malarial 
islands, and to them should go the baptismal rights. The Gujaratis and Maharashtrians 
always called it Mumbai, when speaking Gujarati or Marathi, and Bombay when 
speaking English. There was no need to choose. In 1995, the Sena demanded that we 
choose, in all our languages, Mumbai. This is how the ghatis took revenge on us. 
They renamed everything after their politicians, and finally they renamed even the 
city.” 70  Mehta here is ventriloquizing the lament of the upper classes and the 
bourgeoisie and he suggests that their conception of the city clashed with the 
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aspirations of those who sought to evoke a different history or communal identity. 
The names Bombay and Mumbai, thus, mask different interpretations of urban space: 
the question of the name is not just about the overthrow of colonial rule or a change 
into the linguistic vernacular; it is also about competing visions of the postcolonial 
city and what the city has come to signify to its inhabitants. 
 When memories of empire are mobilized in the nation state, these memories 
often rub up against competing desires, priorities, and programmes. Algerians ought 
to have repudiated torture, given the prevalence of the practice in colonial times and 
the devastation it wrought then. But torture continued all too patently, and its use in 
domestic conflict forestalled a fuller analysis of the colonial period, in the fear that 
such an analysis might lead to unfortunate truths about the present situation. The 
inhabitants of Bombay ought to have greeted the erasure of the city’s old name as the 
joyful rejection of a time when they, along with other Indians, lived under a colonial 
regime. Many were jubilant. But others saw the renaming as proof that their city was 
taken over by a violent, neo-fascist, anti-Muslim party and feared that their polity had 
lost its vibrant, multi-ethnic, and hospitable character. Unfortunately, subsequent 
developments, including horrifying violence and civic dysfunction, appeared to bear 
out their anxieties. The cold realities of postcoloniality require the state to repress or 
manipulate colonial memories, to bully minorities into submission, and to give fresh 
dreams to an unsettled populace. 
 
Repetition Compulsion? 
 “It has often seemed to me far easier,” Sheldon Pollock says, “to argue that it 
isn’t those who forget the past who are condemned to repeat it, but, on the contrary, 
those—in Ayodhya, Belfast, Jerusalem, Kosovo, or Washington—who remember it. 
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And this makes it clear that we have not made much progress in understanding the 
advantages and disadvantages of history for life.”71 Pollock adds that the comparative 
study of empires shows that empires become imperial, that is, empires are made, by 
the action of looking at older empires. Historical empires stoke the flames of 
aspiration as much as they hold up warnings to would-be imperialists. Empires often 
proceed by imitation, and most successful colonialists, from the Achaemenid Persians 
to the French and British, have displayed an awareness of hoarier exemplars and an 
inclination to follow or surpass them in conception and in detail. Indeed, a great deal 
remains to be said about the practice of imperial mimesis, about what provokes it and 
about what succour it draws from historical memory. 
 But there is something in Pollock’s claim that resonates uncannily with the 
Freudian concept of compulsion, and this resonance is worth a concluding glance. 
Pollock himself does not treat Freud in any detail in his discussion, but he looks at 
historical phases where empires are driven to mimic other empires and he asks how 
the world might move toward “a new future, a kind of Empire that might finally end 
the numbingly repeated imitations of empire.” For Pollock, a possible way to avoid 
imperial repetition and to progress to an age without imperialism lies in such models 
as “the Sanskritic cosmopolitanism of Bharata Varsha and the Islamic 
cosmopolitanism of Al-Hind, which suggest however faintly some alternatives.”72 
Unlike Freud, who seldom offered the salve of utopia to his readers, Pollock appears 
to be saying that, were we to look back to precise historical periods and concepts, we 
would be able to forge a community in the future that was less imperial and more 
egalitarian and more peaceful than the empires of recent history. Pollock finds these 
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moments of promise not in the immediate past of the West but in older, non-Western 
formations. 
 It was to ancient Egypt that Freud turned in Moses and Monotheism, the book 
in which he explored the possibility that Moses was an Egyptian priest in the kingdom 
of the pharaoh Akhenaten.73 In Freud’s account, Moses is originally Egyptian and not 
Hebrew, while the originary traces of Mosaic monotheism prove to be Egyptian as 
well. There are many ways to understand Freud’s study of historical memory, but in 
this context it would be essential to refer both to Edward Said’s brief exploration in 
Freud and the Non-European and Jacqueline Rose’s response to Said. “For Freud,” 
Said says, “writing and thinking in the mid-1930s, the actuality of the non-European 
was its constitutive presence as a sort of fissure in the figure of Moses—founder of 
Judaism, but an unreconstructed non-Jewish Egyptian none the less. Jahveh derived 
from Arabia, which was also non-Jewish and non-European.”74 According to Said, the 
central implication of Freud’s book is that Jewish identity, including Freud’s own 
identity, was divided from the inside, and that its defining characteristic was the 
combination of Jewish, non-Jewish, and non-European elements. To be Jewish, for 
Freud, was to be cosmopolitan through and through. Jewish identity, in this analysis, 
cannot conceive of itself “without that radical originary break or flaw which will not 
be repressed, because Moses was Egyptian.”75 Thus, the historical memory of Moses 
agrees with Freud’s self-conception of Jewish identity and shows the psychoanalyst 
himself to be a many-sided, worldly individual. Yet, Said also makes the further point 
that a group with this sense of identity could potentially reach out to another fraught 
identity, “by attending to it as a troubling, disabling, destabilizing secular wound—the 
essence of the cosmopolitan, from which there can be no recovery, no state of 
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resolved or Stoic calm, and no utopian reconciliation even within itself.”76 Said thus 
suggests that Israeli Jews ought to embrace Freud’s vision, reach out to Palestinians 
as another people with a complicated identity, and seek to live peacefully, and on 
equal terms, with them, so that both might be able to co-exist harmoniously together. 
 Rose observes in her response that there is an additional dimension that needs 
to be brought to bear on Said’s analysis: trauma and the response to trauma. As Rose 
writes, “the most historically attested response to trauma is to repeat it.”77 Freud’s text 
is surely marked by at least a couple of violently traumatic moments, including the 
murder of Moses by the Jews and the exodus from Egypt. And Freud himself saw the 
book as further denial of the conventional Jewish understanding of Moses, a denial he 
made explicit in his memorable opening sentence (“To deprive a people of the man 
whom they take pride in as the greatest of their sons is not a thing to be gladly or 
carelessly undertaken, least of all by someone who is himself one of them”). But quite 
apart from the literal and figurative killing of Moses, and quite apart from the 
historical memory with which Freud attempts to engage, there is the historical 
situation in which the book appeared. Freud’s book was published, in 1939, the year 
of his death, after he was forced to flee Vienna and seek refuge in London, and after 
he had reworked the text during the latter half of the 1930s. The book assumes a 
poignancy in the light of Freud’s exile, and postwar readers cannot but approach 
Moses and Monotheism without an awareness of the Holocaust as well as of the 
author’s anguish. 
 The identity of a people who have suffered from a trauma so enormous can 
only have undergone a huge stress — and not necessarily for the better. Rose asks, 
“Are we at risk of idealizing the flaws and fissures of identity?” and she points out 
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that trauma, far from leading to openness, can cause “identities to batten down, to go 
exactly the other way: towards dogma, the dangers of coercive and coercing forms of 
faith.”78 In other words, Israel’s treatment of Palestinians can be interpreted as a 
response to the historical traumas suffered by Jews, and Israel’s recent history 
suggests that a traumatized people may go on to inflict suffering on others. On this 
analysis, Freud’s analysis of historical memory is unlikely to provide a model for the 
peaceful co-existence of Israelis and Palestinians in a shared space. The implication of 
his work and its subsequent reception, rather, is that communities are forged on acts 
of primal murder, that trauma gives rise to the repetition of traumatic violence, and 
that the memory of oppression is invoked to visit oppression on others. Rose thus 
draws on Freud’s work in order to qualify Said’s interpretation of his late 
masterpiece. 
 Said’s lecture emerges from Rose’s response as a ‘misreading’ of Freud as 
much as a noble attempt to seek a blueprint for reconciliation. Yet, Freud’s own 
treatment of Egyptian and Hebrew material in Moses and Monotheism was also a 
misreading of the sources, as many scholars have remarked, and even in his own day 
few established historians actually espoused the views he held about the ‘the man 
Moses’. But what is powerful in each case is less the interpretive misprision and more 
the uses to which the thinker put his analyses, less the putative inaccuracy and more 
the challenge to a contemporary state of affairs. Each author was compulsively drawn 
to make an intervention in the political situation of his own day, Freud in relation to 
the already dangerous circumstances of Jews in the 1930s, Said in relation to the 
postwar plight of Palestinians. Each was responding to a trauma, the understanding of 
which was shaped by memories historical and personal. Each teaches his readers, as 
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indeed does Pollock, that remembering the past is not merely sufficient to avoid 
repeating it and that what we remember is often shaped by the cues of the moment. 
Memories of empire are variable, and the way we stitch them together are the result of 
present exigencies. The lesson for us appears to be that working through jealousy, 
melancholia, nostalgia, or euphoria is one way to come to a deeper understanding of 
the past and to avoid repeating the worst excesses of empire. 
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